The shadow of nationalist populism has been cast over Southeast Asia. Three decades since a wave of democratic revolutions swept authoritarian dictatorships out of power in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, a new set of “strongmen” has emerged to challenge the liberal democratic order. These three countries were formerly hailed as exemplars of democratization in the region. However, democratic consolidation in these countries has been ambivalent, often prone to democratic deficits. The post-financial crisis period coincided with the rise of the first wave of populists in the region. Charismatic and popular leaders like Joseph Estrada and Thaksin Shinawatra arose in these countries to espouse populist causes and to win the votes of the oppressed, amidst the failure of previous leaders to institute social reforms and consolidate democracy. The inability of middle class-based reformism and the continuance of money politics fueled a growing desire among the electorate for a new anti-elitist and pro-poor political program. Unsurprisingly, these two leaders were ousted by the military-backed liberal urban elites.
The second wave of populism in the region is marked by the politics of anger and frustration, not so much from the poor, but the urban middle class. This resentment was manifested by the near victory of former New Order lieutenant general Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia, the victory of controversial crime-busting mayor Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and the consolidation of political power by retired general and junta leader Prayuth Chan-o-cha in Thailand. Cass Mudde described populism as “an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism.” This research will trace the emerging contours of political contestation in Southeast Asia between law and order, nationalist populists, and the liberal moral reformists. Moreover, it will critically assess the challenges to democratic consolidation and the uncertain future of liberal democracy in the region.